Policy

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    [post_date] => 2024-02-26 17:32:37
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Nearly three months after COP28, are we actually delivering on its promises?



The day before COP28 began in the UAE last November, a damning report was released by the Centre For Climate Reporting, confirming what many had already suspected: COP28 President Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber had taken multiple meetings with various oil-producing countries throughout the year, likely swaying his priorities for the conference ahead. While Al Jaber’s legitimacy had already been in question, this latest report put his credibility on a cliff. As such, COP28 began with damage control: The first move of Al Jaber’s presidency was to operate the Loss and Damage fund based on recommendations from the Transitional Committee, achieving its passage with unanimous support. 



It was an easy win, but not a big enough one—and just a couple months into 2024, I worry what was and wasn’t achieved at COP28 might be an arbiter for climate action in the year to come. 



Although the fund’s operation was a step in the right direction—facilitating financial resources for countries already suffering the impacts of climate change—as written, many factors could prevent it from working as intended. Most notably, the Transitional Committee’s (questionable) recommendation to name the World Bank as the operation entity, and the absence of the equity principle, would both affect the fund's ability to assist the nations most vulnerable to climate inaction. To help with this, after the failure of an agreement at SB58, COP28 agreed on the Santiago Network as the fund’s host, operationalizing technical assistance for these countries in loss and damage matters. But it’s unclear if it will be enough.



It also wouldn’t be the only agreement reached during the conference that left something to be desired. After enabling the Loss and Damage fund, the parties focused on the most pressing matter of COP28: the global stocktake decision. In Article 14, the Paris Agreement defined a period of five years for reevaluating the treaty's implementation and projecting priorities for the following period, with COP28 designated for the first assessment. This year, the most polemic aspect of this negotiation focused on the phrase “fossil fuel phase out” (FFPO), an expression embraced and proposed by the Least Developed Countries (LDC) at COP23, in hopes of more ambitious climate action. Regrettably, based on the strong opposition of various oil-producing countries, the initial presidency draft of the global stocktake did not include the phrase FFPO anywhere in the text, causing upset among those supportive of its inclusion. This latter group comprised 127 parties, including the Independent Association of Latin America and the Caribbean (AILAC), the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), the EU, and even the US. However, despite overwhelming support, universal consensus is vital for adopting new decisions at COPs—and oil-producing countries did not give in to their demands. 



Eventually, compromise was reached between the two opposing sides, and instead of using FFPO, the language was changed to include "transitioning away from fossil fuels in energy systems" and “phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies,” enabling the parties to reach an agreement. Although this small move towards ending fossil fuels is valuable, the latest draft of the stocktake leaves much room for interpretation as to what those two phrases mean—its language too vague to hold many parties accountable. For example, the text only calls for transitioning away from fossil fuels when used in energy systems, thus excluding some industries, such as transportation, from being asked to the same. There has also been talk of "transition fuels," which would be very favorable to the interests of polluting actors, allowing greenwashing commitments to take the place of actually transitioning away from fossil fuels. Ultimately, all of this suggests that although the revised text of the global stocktake decision was an improvement from the first draft, it does not ensure that polluting states and companies will not continue to exploit fossil fuels: It is merely a first step towards a better horizon, but still a very fragile one.



Helping to fortify that step, it was also decided that the Just Transition program—which advocates for shifting from an extractive to a regenerative economy worldwide, and is likely to be a vital part of the next global stocktake in 2028—would go into operation "immediately after" the end of COP28. But regarding climate finance—in other words, the means by which climate action is funded—it was decided a draft decision would be written later this year, the same year in which three workshops and three work program meetings will be held. The substance of what’s to come will remain for SB60 and COP29, and is perhaps the most impactful element of the upcoming negotiations. 



In the interim, there is much that must be done—with a few key factors standing in the way. Consensus is a crucial element in climate negotiations, requiring broad agreements across parties to implement the objectives of the UNFCCC. But it remains unclear how exactly “consensus” is defined at these conferences, as Article 42 of the UNFCCC’s procedural rules—which present two alternative means to reach consensus—has not yet been adopted, leaving much space for interpretation and thus, conflict. At COP16 in Cancún, for example, Bolivia interpreted consensus to mean unanimity, and tried to block the agreed decision, believing it wasn't ambitious enough. In response, the COP16 presidency insisted that "the consensus rule does not imply unanimity, much less does it imply the possibility of a delegation exercising a right to veto after years of hard work and sacrifice [of the other parties]." Without an explicit definition, the possibility that some groups or states will attempt to block other agreements remains open. 



For the climate regime's success, decisions adopted by the COP must be widely supported and legitimized. Currently, multilateralism and civil society both help ensure this is possible. At COP28, when oil-producing states opposed including FFPO in the decision text, both developing and developed nations joined forces to create the language in the current draft. But they were able to achieve this compromise, in part, because of outside support. Usually, the role of civil society is especially relevant in each stage leading up to every COP. Reports, statements, and advocacy are vital for influencing state agents in pursuing, prioritizing, and incorporating climate ambition into their decisions. At COP28, the typical preambular role of civil society was extended into the very conference itself. After receiving the presidency draft of the global stocktake decision, several demonstrations were organized within the venue in an attempt to pressure delegates to make improvements to it, and to make evident the public opinion that the original presidency draft would entail a regression for climate action. I believe these last minute demonstrations were crucial for the parties who wanted more climate ambition: Without their work and effort, the final version of the decision text would likely not have even mentioned fossil fuels at all.  



Still, more consistency and clarity are needed to continue advancing climate action in the right direction, both in 2024 and beyond. The gaps in the "transitioning away" formula adopted by the parties will require immense caution moving forward. It is essential not to repeat COP26’s and COP27’s mistakes, where the former merely mentioned fossil fuels but the latter did not deliver any progress. The prospect of COP29 will not be easy, with another oil-producing host country and a former oil industry CEO as President of the Conference. All of the elements that prevented COP28 from being a fiasco are required and must be maximized in Azerbaijan. Achieving the phase out of fossil fuels depends on developing countries, especially, increasing climate action, and at COP29, developed countries should demonstrate their willingness to achieve the FFPO by committing and effectively transferring the necessary resources to these developing nations. As such, climate finance must be a priority. The fragile progress of COP28 requires a growth curve in the following COPs, setting ambitious targets and equivalent means for achieving them. Let's dream of a COP30, with the background of the Amazon in Belém do Para, actually establishing and moving towards the FFPO. 

    [post_title] => The State of Climate Action in 2024
    [post_excerpt] => Nearly three months after COP28, are we actually delivering on its promises?
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    [post_date] => 2023-09-29 08:36:00
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And why more effective climate multilateralism is how we can fix it.



According to the latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), released last year, “It is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean, and land.” In other words, very little has changed from what we’ve known for decades: Climate change is real, it’s largely our fault, and we still aren’t doing nearly enough to reverse it.



After meticulous review of more than 14,000 papers published in the most prestigious journals, scientists from all 195 countries have once again firmly established that the Earth’s temperature has been steadily trending upwards since the Industrial Revolution. Climate disasters are worryingly increasing, and rising summer temperatures are already reaching levels unbearable for humans, ecosystems, and wildlife. Meanwhile, violent floods and unexpected rainstorms are ravaging cities and towns around the world. There are also the less perceptible and slower-onset symptoms, which have only further aggravated the bigger climate crisis. The North Pole’s steady decline, for example, is already wreaking havoc on vulnerable ecosystems and communities, decreasing coastal land for Small Island Developing States due to rising sea levels. Newly and acutely exposed, these nations have been forced to risk their lives and their little resources to cope without larger international support.



Echoing the movie Don’t Look Up, science is once again telling us that climatic distortions are happening, and every day the dimension and frequency of those distortions will only get more severe. Yet, despite the strong IPCC evidence and the current lived reality of climate impacts, certain segments of society, including large swaths of the media and various industries and governments, would still prefer not to “look up” at all. For them, opting for business-as-usual remains the more comfortable and profitable option, perpetuating a hazardous path of inaction. Even more concerning, these inactive groups have had a large influence in critical spaces for climate action, including recent international climate negotiations.



Since 1992, governments worldwide have convened at least twice a year, functioning under the umbrella of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), with the goal of increasing climate action. It is at these conferences that the states have adopted previous conventions, including the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement: The annual Conference of the Parties (COP) serves as the “supreme decision-making body of the Convention” and the key organ for the implementation of the year’s negotiations. 



However, in recent years, momentum has stalled. While the urgency and need for climate action has only grown, the tide of inaction has, as well. The pace at which we are fighting climate change is too slow in comparison with how quickly severe climate effects have accelerated. After I returned from the Bonn Climate Change Conference (SB58) this past June, I couldn’t help but feel frustrated: Slow action amidst rapid climate change is only going to lead to more critical scenarios—and the only path out of it is embracing multilateralism.



The vital role of climate multilateralism



The literature on climate change qualifies it as a “common concern of humankind,” reinforcing its global nature and, therefore, the shared responsibility of every country to confront it. At the same time, climate multilateralism acknowledges that certain countries share a greater responsibility for causing it, and should contribute more resources to its solutions. Developed nations, historically responsible for the vast majority of emissions that are today heating up our planet, must take the lead in reducing them and provide more vulnerable nations with the necessary resources to tackle the climate impacts they’ve caused. Similarly, groups that are disproportionately affected by climate change—including non-party stakeholders—deserve representation when it comes to discussing its solutions, an expansion of the concept that the UNFCCC defines as "inclusive multilateralism.”



The significance of climate multilateralism cannot be overstated; it has been the bedrock for previous crucial negotiations and agreements. Without it, we would be trying to face the global climate threat as individual nations rather than a cohesive whole, leading to fragmented strategies and inefficient outcomes. But it also comes with its own problems—less with the concept of climate multilateralism itself, and more with enhancing its efficacy.



"In other words, very little has changed from what we’ve known for decades: Climate change is real, it’s largely our fault, and we still aren’t doing nearly enough to reverse it."



Slow progress in climate negotiations



Since the 2015 Paris Agreement, climate negotiations have struggled to make major progress, due to everything from administrative issues to more fundamental challenges, like the constant obstacle of the fossil fuel industry’s interest in preventing it. But perhaps one of the biggest hurdles for progress has been how effectively time is spent at these conferences, and how negotiations are prioritized. For example, I had the opportunity to follow, as an observer, the Just Transition program negotiations in Bonn. This program advocates for a global shift “from an extractive economy to a regenerative economy,” and is one of multiple, ongoing negotiations that aims to ensure equitable outcomes when considering climate mitigation and adaptation.  Initially, the discussions focused on making sure participating nations understood the concept of Just Transition, and different views emerged. Some developed countries stressed a narrow view of the program, connecting it only to labor and energy aspects, and excluding how various communities might potentially be affected by it. Alternatively, some developing countries, alongside a few developed ones, advocated for broadening the program’s framework, arguing for the necessity of fair transitions for different communities, and a more extensive scope beyond energy issues.



Having heard the discussion, and having done additional research on Just Transition, I was hopeful. These kinds of debates were necessary for global forums, and any agreements reached could eventually contribute to more commitments and implemented actions. However, my optimism dwindled during the second week, when—rather than continue with the negotiations—the negotiators chose to dedicate two days to discussing when they might be able to schedule a workshop on the topic for the parties and stakeholders interested.



While workshops are undeniably invaluable for complex issues, which in turn can facilitate agreements on more substantive matters, spending two sessions picking a date for a workshop seemed both inefficient and a waste of resources to me. Gathering delegations from almost every country is costly, so it’s crucial attendees prioritize agendas and methodologies that actually drive progress on climate action—not stall it further.



Sitting in the Just Transition negotiations, it became clear another crucial aspect affecting the efficacy of climate multilateralism is fairness. Delegations from less developed countries, often smaller in number, rely heavily on climate multilateralism in order to be heard. These nations, assuming huge efforts, send delegations to represent the voices of the most vulnerable communities from their respective countries. It is against the equity principle of the climate regime, then, to prioritize discussions on topics that while important, could be addressed elsewhere. This bureaucratization of negotiations impedes agreements on more substantive and relevant areas, and ignores the financial and operative efforts required of less developed countries, often preventing them from participating. Indeed, during the Just Transition program negotiation, it was the EU who began the debate on the date of the workshop, disregarding the efforts and budgeting of poorer countries and organizations, hoping to return to their home countries with more substantive and positive news than news of a forthcoming workshop.



Oil and gas lobbylists: Wolves in sheep's clothing



Another critical factor affecting climate negotiations is the substantive participation of lobbyists from the fossil fuel industry. These lobbyists, usually sponsored by countries with fossil fuel interests, have a clear objective: to impede and delay meaningful climate action. According to Global Witness, at COP 27, 636 registered fossil fuel lobbyists participated in climate talks, representing an increase of over 25% from COP 26. The same report points out there were more fossil fuel lobbyists than delegates from the ten countries most impacted by climate change at the same conference.



Although these lobbyists have the legitimate right to attend climate negotiations, their immense financial resources and support from oil-producing nations causes them to be overrepresented and to wield too much power. In addition, many of them are not transparent about the interests they represent, often adopting environmental or government badges to camouflage their advocacy against climate action.



A paradigmatic case that highlights the potential dangers of this was last year, when BP’s chair, Bernard Looney, alongside four other BP employees, attended COP 27 as delegates of Mauritania, a country where the company holds major investments. Mauritania, meanwhile, is a country that has been dramatically affected by climate change, showing the conflict of interest between the country’s most vulnerable communities and the people sent to represent them.



Fortunately, there have been positive steps toward promoting transparency and legitimacy in climate negotiations. During the last plenary of SB58, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Simon Stiell announced that from now on, “every single badged participant attending the event will be required to list their affiliation and relationship to that organization.” This significant transparency measure aims to ensure greater accountability for attendees, especially regarding the role of the fossil fuel industry in climate negotiations. During COP 28, scheduled for later this year, delegates will be required to fill a form designating the organization they represent, enhancing the integrity of negotiations and potentially combating some factors delaying progress.



As the pace of climate effects exceeds the progress of climate multilateralism, it becomes imperative to rethink and improve the way that our discussions and agreements take place. Climate multilateralism is indeed the most essential instrument for attaining global agreements and actions, making it crucial to enhance its efficacy in alignment with the urgent climate crisis—and we must take steps to ensure its success.



Transparency measures, combined with continued vigilance and accountability, are a good first step to help safeguard the integrity of climate negotiations. So is rethinking how best to delegate time and efforts at the conferences themselves: Effectiveness, efficiency, and fairness are all vital to maximizing and fostering actionable commitments, strengthening climate multilateralism, and galvanizing collective efforts towards a more resilient and sustainable world. By acknowledging the urgency of the situation and collectively working towards decisive action, we can build a more secure and thriving future for generations to come. Now, we just have to do it.

    [post_title] => Why Global Climate Negotiations Have Stalled
    [post_excerpt] => And why more effective climate multilateralism is how we can fix it.
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